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Introduction 
 
Linguists who believe that they have resolved the problems identified in Ferdinand 
de Saussure’s Cours de linguistique général (2005; [1916]) and philosophers who 
think that Saussure is irrelevant to the concerns of the philosophy of language are 
both mistaken. Reading Saussure’s foundational linguistics from the perspective of a 
broadly  conceived  philosophy  of  language  means  in  the  first  instance  to  address 
some of the most basic principles involved in the study of natural language. The fact 
that this text was compiled posthumously from Saussure’s notes is hardly an obstacle 
to such an undertaking since none of his surviving manuscripts contradicts those 
leading principles. (Saussure 1997; Godel 1954; 1958-9; Bouquet and Engler 2002; 
Engler 2004). In particular, the point that Saussure had to distance himself from 
historical linguistics in order to pursue the core characteristics of language in general 
remains beyond doubt. (e.g. Bouquet and Engler 2004, Introduction) Certainly, the 
Cours as it has come down to us clearly reflects three important steps in Saussure’s 
thinking as documented in his public lectures: language as system instantiated in the 
mind (1907); the notion of the linguistic sign as part of semiologie (1908-9); and the 
internal  mechanism  of  the  linguistic  sign  (1910-11).  (Komatsu  and  Wolf  1996; 
Komatsu  and  Wolf  1997;  Komatsu  and  Harris  1993).  Nevertheless,  the  question 
where to allocate Saussure in the philosophical scheme of things is not at all easy. He 
cannot  be  readily  aligned  with  the  ‘linguistic  pragmatists’  (the  late  Wittgenstein, 
Quine, Sellars, Dummett, Davidson), nor with model-theoretical Platonists (Frege, 
Russell, Carnap, Tarksi). (Brandom 2000: 7) Historically, the Saussurean projects 
stands very much on its own. At its heart we find, among other seminal insights, the 
bare bones of a theory of meaning, crystallised in his definition of the linguistic sign 
as an arbitrary relation between the publically available lexicon of a natural language 
on the one hand and, on the other, the Vorstellungen which we typically entertain in 
the process of understanding. In this paper I will substitute the term Vorstellung for 
Saussure’s two terms idée (e.g., 33, 47, 104, 144, 155, 166) and concept (e.g., 28f., 
31,  98f.,  144f.,  158f.)  on  the  grounds  that  in  the  Cours  they  are  deployed 
indiscriminately  and  that  Vorstellung  defined  as  ‘mental  transformation  of 
perception’ seems to me to capture best the text’s ‘intention’. Saussure places the 
relation  between  linguistic  expression  (word,  phrase,  sentence)  and  Vorstellung 
(idée; concept) within a general ‘sémiologie’, a theory of signs in which language 
occupies  a  special  niche.  From  this  perspective,  language  can  be  compared  with RIFL (2010) 3: 12-10 (Saussure filosofo del linguaggio, 10) 
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nonverbal systems at the level of the sign viewed as a combination of a signifiant, or 
signifier, and a signifié, or signified. For natural language, this semiological unity 
Saussure calls the ‘linguistic sign’, characterised as an ‘arbitrary’ combination of its 
components. It is this definition that forms the focus of the present paper. If it turns 
out that Saussure is correct in his assumption that both signifier and signified are 
indeed arbitrary or unmotivated, then his conclusion that the linguistic sign as a 
whole must be arbitrary goes through. If, however, it can be demonstrated that one of 
the two components of the linguistic sign is motivated, then his thesis of arbitrariness 
collapses. I will argue that Saussure’s assumptions of the chaotic nature of idée, 
concept or Vorstellung and the resulting arbitrariness of the signified are mistaken 
and, as a result, the linguistic sign is in need of re-definition.  
 
1. Saussurean arbitrariness 
 
1.1 The linguistic sign 
 
At the centre of Saussure’s systemic conception of language as langue, distinguished 
from langage as language in action and parole as individual speech event, we find 
his definition of the linguistic sign, which differs markedly from the theorisation of 
language  in  the  Fregean  tradition.  Unlike  Frege,  Saussure  does  not  allocate  the 
notion of the sign to linguistic expressions. Rather, the linguistic sign is made up of 
two components, a sound image (l’image acoustique) and a Vorstellung (concept, 
idée). Only when these two components come together has a linguistic sign been 
realised. As Saussure insists, «une suite de sons n’est linguistique que si elle est le 
support d’une idée» (Saussure 2005: 144). At the same time and as a result of the 
incorporation of this Vorstellung within the linguistic sign, l’idée now reappears as a 
«qualité de la substance phonetique» (144f.) These two elements must however not 
be confused with a name and a thing. (98) They are both part of a mental process, an 
«association psychique» (28) together constituting «une entité psychique». (99) That 
is, the linguistic sign is instantiated in the mind. Saussure conceives of this process as 
a «circuit». (31) Once this circuit is completed the linguistic sign is severed from the 
origins of one its components, the «faits de conscience» (28), «idées» (33, 47, 144, 
155, 166), «concepts» (28f., 31, 98f., 144f., 158f.) or Vorstellungen, understood here 
as  mental  transformations  of  perception.  In  the  Cours  this  independence  of  the 
linguistic sign from the origins of and in Vorstellung is summed up in the conviction 
that natural language, viewed as langue and just like its formal cousins, «est une 
forme et non une substance». (169; 157). Yet, the linguistic relation between sound 
image and Vorstellung turns out to be only a special case within a much broader 
theoretical frame, Saussure’s sémiologie, a general theory of signs in which language 
occupies centre stage. «On peut donc concevoir une science qui étudie la vie des 
signes au sein de la vie sociale». (33) Since the study of language, Saussure predicts, 
is a branch of such a new science, the laws which semiology is going to discover will 
apply  to  language.  In  anticipation  of  such  laws,  then,  Saussure  formulates  the 
principles which govern the specifics of the linguistic sign by generalising its two 
components. The sound image is covered by the notion of the signifier (signifiant), 
the Vorstellung by that of the signified (signifié). (97ff.) It would appear that by 
invoking Vorstellung (idée, concept) as the content of the signified and so as an 
essential component of the linguistic sign Saussure revived an already discredited 
Lockean notion. (Locke 1993: 45-289) After all, Frege had eliminated Vorstellung 
from his description of Sinn and Bedeutung in 1892 on the grounds that its subjective RIFL (2010) 3: 12-10 (Saussure filosofo del linguaggio, 10) 
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ingredients  disqualified  it  from  playing  a  role  in  any  logical  account  of  natural 
language semantics. (Frege 1970) And could one not argue that since Saussure’s 
central  aim  was  to  put  the  study  of  language  on  a  proper  scientific  footing  he 
undermined his own goal by giving mental processes such prominence in his theory? 
There is a deep rift in the theorisation of language between approaches shunning 
psychological questions and a resurgence of theories in which mental processes once 
more play an indispensable role. On the one hand we have truth-conditional theories 
of a Fregean persuasion (Wiggins 1992) or truth-conditional arguments in the wake 
of Tarski’s ‘Convention-T’ (Davidson 2004) and the tradition of meaning scepticism 
best represented by the description of meaning as use’; (Wittgenstein 2005) on the 
other hand there is a burgeoning literature insisting that without consideration of 
mental facts we can capture only part of what is going on in language. (Hurford 
2007;  Jackendoff  2002;  Corballis  2002;  Johnson  and  Lakoff  1999;  Gallese  and 
Lakoff 2005; Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Ruthrof 1997; 2000; 2010) Given this 
situation as well as recent scientific evidence, the Lockean account looks ripe for 
some kind of rehabilitation. Suffice it to say here that the philosophy of language is 
not in a strong position today to discredit Saussure’s psychological emphasis. Nor are 
the real problems of the Saussurean account to be sought in his description of the 
linguistic sign as mentally instantiated. Saussure’s flaws lie elsewhere. What does 
require careful scrutiny is the widely accepted idea of the radical arbitrariness of the 
linguistic sign. 
 
1.2 Radical arbitrariness 
 
Le  lien  unissant  le  significant  au  signifié  est  arbitraire,  ou  encore,  puisque  nous 
entendons par signe le total resultant de l‘association d’signifiant à un singifié, nous 
pouvons dire plus simplement: le signe linguistique est arbitraire (100).  
 
Such is the stark claim of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign, an assertion so 
readily accepted both in linguistics and the philosophy of language that Saussure 
could  confidently  write  «le  principe  de  l’arbitraire  du  signe  n’est  contesté  par 
personne». (100) Saussure’s contention is radical in the sense that we are dealing 
here with four different kinds of arbitrariness: (1) of the signifier; (2) the signified; 
(3) the bond between signifier and signified; and (4) the sign as a whole. It is the 
central concern of this paper to reflect on this popular proposition. But first we must 
deal  with  a  number  of  consession  made  by  Saussure,  none  of  which  however 
undermines his core assertion. There is reference to onomatopoeia which, on closer 
scrutiny, does not however seriously weaken the notion of arbitrariness since the 
mimetic sounds in diverse languages differ significantly from one another. (101f.) 
There is the concession that «le signe peut être relativement motive», (181) but only 
diachronically so. Saussure allows for different kinds of motivation of the linguistic 
sign to the point where he admits that «il n’existe pas de langue où rien ne soit 
motive» but at the same time «quant à en concevoir une où tout le serait, ce la serait 
impossible  par  definition».  (183).  This,  however,  only  affects  changes  within 
language and not the principles of the linguistic sign itself. An exception appears to 
be Saussure’s remark on Chinese, which he describes as ‘ultra-lexicological’ and so 
relatively highly motivated. (183) Yet even here Saussure leaves no doubt as to the 
soundness of the principle of arbitrariness. He does so because of his commitment to 
the idea that both components which make up the linguistic sign, the sound image of 
the signifier and the Vorstellung or signified, are arbitrary. To be sure, if Saussure is RIFL (2010) 3: 12-10 (Saussure filosofo del linguaggio, 10) 
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right in this assumption, his arbitrariness thesis is unassailable. On the other hand, 
should one of the components of the linguistic sign prove to be motivated, his thesis 
would rest on a pars pro toto fallacy. 
 
1.3 The nebulous world of Vorstellung in Saussure 
 
A commitment crucial for Saussure’s radical arbitrariness is his belief that «notre 
pensée n’est qu’une masse amorphe et indistinct». Without language, we could not 
distinguish two Vorstellungen (idées) clearly and consistently. In fact, on its own, our 
thinking  is  nothing  but  a  nebulous  cloud,  «une  nébuleuse»,  in  which  nothing  is 
delimited of necessity. (155) This passage, while uncontroversial at the beginning of 
the twentieth century when evolutionary biology had scarcely become a respectable 
science,  stands  in  sharp  contrast  to  what  we  are  now  learning  about  our  animal 
relatives and the lives of hominids several millions of years prior to the invention of 
language. Tigers, known for their precision hunting, could not have survived if they 
lived in Saussure’s «royaume flottant»; nor could our pre-linguistic forebears, who 
for  millennia  produced  precision  instruments  out  of  carefully  selected  materials. 
What is not in dispute here is the weaker thesis that language constitutes a significant 
refinement of nonverbal distinctions, a point to be taken up later. Given Saussure’s 
conviction that our thought processes are chaotic by nature unless they are organised 
by language and his endeavour to challenge historical linguistics by a synchronic, 
scientifically generalised approach, it is not surprising that he debunked the study of 
the  evolution  of  language.  (156).  The  question  of  the  origin  of  language,  says 
Saussure, should not be posed at all (105). After all, in the study of language there is 
nothing to be found that looks like natural data (116). But it is one thing to say that 
language  is  a  refinement  of  Vorstellungen  in  the  sense  that  it  transforms  raw 
Vorstellungen into a series of fine-grain linguistic concepts and quite another to say 
that without language everything is nebulous. (cfr. 26) There is now a growing body 
of studies aiming to tone down or even reverse the Saussurean position on this matter 
(Bickerton 1981; 1990; 1995; Jackendoff 2002; Hurford 2007). While the jury is still 
out on what precisely we mean by linguistic refinement, it looks as if Saussure’s 
strong  assumption  of  the  vagueness  of  Vorstellungen  may  be  no  more  than  a 
prejudice. Another objection to Saussure’s foggy world of Vorstellung can be raised 
from measurements of the human ability to make thousands of olfactory distinctions 
in  the  face  of  the  stark  poverty  of  olfactory  differentiations  in  the  lexica  of  our 
natural languages (Ackerman 1991). Not everything we can clearly distinguish is 
equally  differentiated  by  language,  which  is  precisely  the  obverse  of  Saussure’s 
claim. Now the boot is on the other foot; it is language that is vague rather than 
perception and its mental derivative, Vorstellung. 
 
 
 
2. Verbal and Nonverbal Semiosis 
 
2.1 The systemic character of Vorstellung  
 
When a new term is created in the world of techno-logos, such as ‘buzzer’, or in the 
class-room,  such  as  ‘rank’,  or  in  the  ghetto,  such  as  ‘dude’,  what  comes  first, 
language  or  a  new  experience  in  need  of  a  linguistic  expression?  Once  the  new 
lexicon is in place both appear to come as a package. Speech communities introduce RIFL (2010) 3: 12-10 (Saussure filosofo del linguaggio, 10) 
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neologisms  to  express  new  nuances  of  experience  and  we  grasp  their 
conceptualisation  when  we  hear  or  read  the  novel  term.  We  are  socialized  into 
meaning  as  use.  Barring  the  red  herring  of  onomatopoeia,  the  terms  chosen  by 
culture  in  such  situations  are  indeed  arbitrary  in  Saussure’s  sense.  But  are  the 
Vorstellungen coded by the new terms equally arbitrary? And more specifically, are 
they not only arbitrary but also ‘chaotic’ with respect to our Wahrnehmungswelt and 
its imaginative variation, our Vorstellungswelt? If we were to agree with Saussure’s 
assumption  of  the  murkiness  of  pensée  on  its  own,  this  would  have  serious 
consequences  for  our  conception  of  biology  and  in  particular  of  perception.  One 
consequence would be that we would have to agree that whatever systematicity there 
is in human perception would have to be derived from language. Furthermore, if we 
accept that Vorstellung is neurally tied to perception, as cognitive science has assured 
us for some time that it is, then Vorstellung likewise would be systemic only as a 
result  of  linguistic  relations.  As  such,  Saussure’s  arbitrariness  thesis  puts  him  in 
irreconcilable conflict with even the most modest form of naturalism, as with the 
uncontroversial assertion by Kant that the unity of consciousness is a precondition of 
all  data  of  Anschauungen,  an  important  implication  of  which  is  a  necessary 
systematicity of perception that is logically prior also to language. (A107). Another 
angle from which we can view Saussure’s nebulous world of nonverbal idées is the 
philosophy of language from Frege to the present where the notion of truth asserted 
by way of recourse to perception has played a major role. From Frege’s link between 
the  truth  values  of  true/false  and  the  notion  of  meaning  to  Moritz  Schlick’s 
verification  procedure  and  the  truth-conditional  arguments  mounted  by  Donald 
Davidson, there is the fundamental assumption that perception itself is a consistently 
reliable  measure  by  which  to  judge  the  sentences  of  natural  language.  While  I 
strongly  oppose  making  truth-oriented  arguments  the  basis  of  a  natural  language 
semantics, because they can at best produce no more than a partial theory, I accept 
that truth and language relations can be informative language games. An intriguing 
game of this sort is played by Hilary Putnam who compares language to a balloon. In 
short he writes, «it seems as if language is like a great balloon, anchored to the 
ground of non-linguistic fact only by a number of widely scattered and very thin (but 
all-important) ropes» (Putnam 1979: 4f.). A Saussurean might object that Putnam’s 
facts  are  contaminated  in  the  sense  that  their  observation  is  always  already 
linguistically  differentiated.  On  the  other  hand,  this  is  the  kind  of  argument  that 
reveals the vicious circularity not only of truth-oriented theories of language but 
equally of the Saussurean linguistic picture itself: nothing, not even reference, can 
escape  the  formal  orbit  of  the  Saussurean  linguistic  sign  and  so  the  idealised 
circularity of langue as a whole. Yet it is not enough to reject the Saussurean account 
on  the  grounds  that  it  «omits  reference».  (Devitt  and  Sterelny  1990:  213)  In 
structural  linguistics  reference  is  still  present,  albeit  as  an  internalised  relation 
amongst  linguistic  signs.  What  requires  emphasis  is  the  absence  of  independent 
nonverbal phenomena. In Saussure’s closed-circuit verbal world there are no such 
things as Putnam’s non-linguistic facts. Before and outside of language, gravity is no 
more than a ‘nébuleuse’. But having named it for example diqiu yinli (earth globe 
pulling  force)  the  mist  has  lifted.  Philosophical  critique  of  Saussure’s  fog  of 
Vorstellung also finds support in recent evolutionary biology. If it is the case that 
human intrinsic intentionality is the result of a very long evolutionary history of the 
cellular division of labour, the question of the systematicity of perception and its 
modifications  in  Vorstellung  can  be  laid  to  rest  for  good.  Cells  responsible  for 
perceptual  input  are  said  to  have  been  increasingly  matched,  from  amoebae  to RIFL (2010) 3: 12-10 (Saussure filosofo del linguaggio, 10) 
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humans,  by  cells  monitoring  such  input  for  the  benefit  of  the  survival  of  the 
organism, to the point where the monitoring capacity of neurons far outstrips the 
input capacity of cells responsible for perception. This scientific narrative provides a 
strong case for the view that both perception and its variants in Vorstellung were 
systemically tied to the objectivities of the world long before language was invented. 
(Fitch 2008). One tentative yet important conclusion we can draw from all of this is 
that it is very likely that Vorstellung is by no means random or arbitrary, but rather a 
systemic reworking of perception. If this is so, and there is no evidence to my mind 
to suggest otherwise, then we must review the Saussurean order. Instead of saying 
that both signifiers and the Vorstellungen we associate with them are arbitrary, we 
should  say  that  while  verbal  signifiers  are  arbitrary,  Vorstellungen  and  therefore 
signifieds  are  not.  And  if  the  thesis  goes  through  that  the  latter  are  systemically 
related  to  perception  as  transformations,  then  the  Saussurean  relation  must  be 
reversed. It is not language that orders Vorstellungen, at least not in the first instance. 
The opposite appears to be the case. Perception and Vorstellung impose order on the 
arbitrary signifiers of language. In other words, while Vorstellung is both motivated 
and  systemic,  language  now  turns  out  to  be  fundamentally  characterised  by 
derivative systematicity or derived motivation. Having said this, there is of course a 
sense in which language calls the shots, as it were. Much of our institutional world 
appears to be created by language rather than by perception and its mental variants, a 
perspective  sympathetic  to  Wittgenstein’s  vista  of  language  as  «refinement» 
(Wittgenstein 1976: 3). 
 
 
2.2 Language as ‘refinement’ 
 
What we have described here speculatively is of course only part of the story, though 
it  remains  a  foundational  relation  between  words  and  Vorstellung.  As  language 
evolved, it increasingly sharpened nonverbal distinctions. So much so that significant 
portions of our lexica and grammars would appear to support the priority Saussure 
grants the verbal. In this sense, language, in large measure, can be regarded as the 
refinement  of  perception  and  Vorstellung.  However  far  from  conceding  that  the 
derivative systematicity or derived motivation of language is a thing of the distant 
past, it should be regarded as the continuing rock bottom of verbal signification. This 
I take to be the gist of Putnam’s metaphor of the balloon of language tied forever, 
even if only sporadically noticeable, to the ground of our Wahrnehmungswelt. One 
might add to Putnam’s observation that though perception provides the main stays 
that prevent the balloon from drifting, it is Vorstellung in schematised form that 
provides language with meaning every step of the way. So we could modify Putnam 
by adding to his «widely scattered and very thin (but all-important) ropes» something 
like «and millions of fine threads tying language to Vorstellung». (Putnam 1979: 4f.). 
This, I suggest, is reflected not only in the lexicon of natural languages, but also in 
their  grammatical  structures.  As  to  the  lexicon,  changing  community  feelings  of 
justice, for example, are reflected in, as much as they are created by, a forever more 
specific  legal  vocabulary.  The  rights  of  individuals  in  general  are  specified  to 
distinguish the rights of gays, lesbians, mothers, children, and the unborn. All forms 
of the splitting of concepts constitute refinements produced by language. But such 
refinement  is  not  restricted  to  the  lexicon;  in  a  certain  sense  it  applies  also  to 
grammar. I think that Derek Bickerton is wrong in his emphasis on the revolutionary 
moment when language as we know it was born as a result of the invention of syntax. RIFL (2010) 3: 12-10 (Saussure filosofo del linguaggio, 10) 
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(Bickerton 1987; 1990) I suggest on the contrary that syntax in its elaborate forms, 
such as conditional structures, evolved on top of a perceptual protosyntax which 
structurally reflected the way the world was realised by hominids. For it is most 
likely  that  after  millennia  of  perceptual  and  gestural  pre-linguistic  existence, 
language  would  have  inherited  and  then  refined  such  relations  and  their 
modifications in Vorstellung, which had served our ancestor so well for so long. 
There is no logical barrier to thinking that thought sequences like ‘if, then’ or ‘only if 
x, then y’ were not already available in perceptual reasoning. If language can indeed 
be regarded as a refinement of perceptual and gestural being, then Saussure’s radical 
dissociation of the iconicity of pre-linguistic grasp from the linguistic signified looks 
must unlikely. But what precisely is being refined here? We could say that language 
specifies  primitive,  perceptual  concepts,  which  we  share  with  non-languaging 
animals, by an ongoing series of conceptual subdivisions of resemblance relations, or 
iconicity. This rests on the definitional assumption that concepts are best described as 
mental regulatory social mechanisms delimiting iconicity generated by the senses 
and  its  neural  transformations.  In  the  visual  domain,  this  process  can  be  readily 
demonstrated. On the other hand, as the verbal gyrations on wine labels testify, in the 
domain of olfactory and gustatory representations language is hardly a match for the 
nuances  we  are  able  to  register.  From  this  basis  one  could  attempt  a  neural 
rehabilitation  of  Kant’s  definition  of  the  concept  as  «a  rule  of  the  synthesis  of 
perception»  (KrV  A722/B750)  and  a  «predicate  of  possible  judgment»,  (KrV 
A69/B94)  while  at  the  same  time  avoid  the  unbridgeable  chasm  that  separates 
Saussure’s linguistic sign from whatever came before. Speculative as such thought 
must remain, it finds summary support in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s remark «Language 
– I want to say –is a refinement, im Anfang war die Tat» (Wittgenstein 1976: 3). 
 
 
2.3 Why language is not an interpreted formal sign system  
 
Given Saussure’s conviction that language is all form with no substance (2005:157; 
169), one might expect that structuralist linguists share the view of language as an 
«interpreted formal sign system» (Grewendorf et al.1987: 377). Saussure’s radical 
arbitrariness of the linguistic sign and his readiness to see the game of chess as an 
«artificial realisation» of natural language suggest that this is so, except for the all-
important qualification that he would not admit an outside to which language could 
be applied. (Saussure 2005: 125; 43; 153) After all, there is nothing distinct outside 
the Saussurean linguistic domain. But whether argued from a realist or a Saussurean 
idealist perspective, the very idea that language can be at all equated with formal sign 
systems rests on a simple confusion of a priori and a posteriori relations. Employing 
an inch tape to check the length of a table can be called an application of a formal 
system to a portion of the phenomenal world. The tape can be regarded as formal in 
the sense that its subdivisions are definitionally controlled and so can be translated 
into another similar formal system, such as a metric tape. So it is tempting to think 
that language works like such tapes in that we apply strings of verbal signifiers to 
nonverbal  phenomena.  This  would  indeed  be  so  if  natural  languages  were  first 
designed as systems coherent in themselves and definitionally secured in the way our 
measuring  tapes  are.  In  short,  the  essential  characteristic  here  is  the  a  priori 
constitution of an axiomatically determined and definitionally secured sign system 
and its practice. But not even an artificial language such as Esperanto satisfies this 
formal  rule.  It  was  construed  in  alignment  with  a  number  of  existing  European RIFL (2010) 3: 12-10 (Saussure filosofo del linguaggio, 10) 
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languages and so reflects their systemic nature inherited from perceptual realities and 
their cultural material and mental variants. Natural language has grown in relation to 
and as an economising reflection of our socio-perceptual world and its modifications 
in Vorstellung. As such, language takes the relation between its arbitrarily chosen 
signifiers not from a formal system of axioms, definitions and syntactic rules, but 
from  the  translation  of  nonverbal  realisations  of  materials,  events,  and  feelings. 
Language is therefore an a posteriori constituted sign system. First comes speech as 
social practice, and then comes its systemic formulation in lexicons and grammar 
books.  This  difference  is  driven  home  when  we  apply  the  formal  notion  of 
recursivity,  an  exercise  which  sooner  or  later  runs  into  the  wall  of  idiomatic 
expressions.  Clearly,  Saussure’s  langue  is  no  more  than  yet  another  a  posteriori 
construction  on  top  of  language,  an  abstractive,  derivative  system  of  explanation 
rather than an axiomatic foundation. An all-important consequence of this is that the 
structure  of  formal  systems  does  not  reflect  a  non-linguistic  order  but  merely 
measures it according to its own terms, while natural language not only measures but 
also,  in  its  very  make-up,  mirrors  a  human  perceptual  order.  This  order  can  be 
expressed  as  an  intersemiotic  integration  of  a  multi-modal,  nonverbal  set  of 
heterogeneous  signs,  such  as  olfactory,  tactile,  gustatory,  gravitational,  aural, 
emotional, visual and other readings of the world, a point to be resumed a little later. 
At a yet more primitive level this interpretive integration performed by the human 
organism  draws  fundamentally  on  physico-chemical  and  bio-chemical  processes, 
including those of our own physiognomy. In this sense, all natural languages are 
deeply motivated, their signs anything but arbitrary. To opt for a chaotic and foggy 
world of perception and its infinite variations in Vorstellung in order to be able argue 
the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign goes against the grain of the basic principles of 
even the most modest kinds of naturalism. Language, it would seem, has inherited its 
base motivation from perception and its mental variants in Vorstellung. And yet, this 
kind  of  motivation  cannot  be  aligned  with  a  simple  correspondence  between 
language and world. The main reason why Alfred Tarski warned his fellow logicians 
in  1936  not  to  apply  Convention-T  to  natural  language  was  that  its  terms  are 
anything but formal. (Tarski 1956: 267; [1936]) Yet there is a further complication. 
The  very  description  of  natural  language  highlights  a  problem  of  philosophical 
inquiry: the shakiness of the correspondence theory of truth. ‘P’ iff ‘p’ suffers from 
the  need  to  express  nonverbal  phenomena  by  verbal  signs.  A  hard-headed 
semiotician,  for  instance,  could  not  in  good  conscience  allow  the  unjustified 
translation between heterosemiotic systems to go unchallenged. Nor are we dealing 
here with only two systems, that of predication on the one hand and the phenomenal 
world on the other. The phenomenal world itself is the result of the intersemiotic 
unification  of  a  number  of  heterosemiotic  systems,  the  combined  result  of 
interpretations of radiation, molecular states, and other physical and bio-chemical 
inputs. This makes correspondence theories of truth look dubious. In a way, then, 
Saussure and his philosophical colleagues are committing similar errors. While the 
former  are  insensitive  to  the  fact  that  their  comparison  rests  on  the  untheorised 
transformation of non-linguistic facts into language, the latter has made a virtue of 
this equivocation. In natural language, a culture has chosen a verbal signifier, say 
‘tree’, which evokes a generalised and schematised Vorstellung of a tree, derived 
from perceptual inputs and their mental transformations under social control. The 
fact that we can translate ‘tree’ by the terms ‘shu’ or ‘arbre’ or ‘Baum’ is often taken 
as  the  result  of  the  self-evident  possibility  of  relating  different  languages  to  one 
another as comparable systems. Yet this is not the way it works. Rather, we can RIFL (2010) 3: 12-10 (Saussure filosofo del linguaggio, 10) 
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translate between Chinese and French strings of verbal signifiers because we share a 
basic  tertium  comparationis:  our  compatible,  even  if  culturally  differentiated, 
nonverbal worlds of perception and Vorstellung. Put more simply, we are able to 
produce  translations  because  we  have  the  same  kind  of  bodies  and  so  generate 
comparable worlds by means and out of more or less the same stuff. Importantly, 
even this common baseline is primarily realised by way of nonverbal, iconic signs.  
 
 
2.4 Enter the nonverbal 
 
One of the crucial differences between the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce and 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s sémiologie is their scope. Peirce embraces everything that is 
an object of interpretation. Accordingly, Peirce’s sign is «something that stands for 
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the 
mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign ….» (CP 
2.228; [1897]) This means that whatever we feel we need to decipher so allocate a 
place in our perceptual and conceptual world, is part of human semiosis. In contrast, 
Saussure’s sémiologie is restricted to social, conventional signs, such as symbolic 
rites, military signals, sign language, (33) pantomime, scales as a symbol of justice 
and forms of greeting. (100f.) So the common practice of referring to both theories as 
semiotics  is  misleading;  it  wipes  out  a  significant  distinction.  I  have  elsewhere 
marked  this  difference  by  distinguishing  ROSS,  or  read-only  sign  system,  from 
COSS, or communicative sign system. (Ruthrof 1997: 37) Nor is it self-evident why 
Saussure would restrict his sémiologie to COSS, since the interpretation of natural 
phenomena, such as thunder or the scent of flowers, is likewise a social activity and 
so well within the purview of his domain of «la vie sociale». (33). Another notable 
difference between the philosophical semiotics of Peirce and Saussurean sémiologie 
is that in the former language is one among a vast number of significatory practices, 
while  in  the  latter  one  cannot  quite  avoid  the  impression  of  a  kind  of  linguistic 
imperialism. At the very least, there is a tension in the Cours between sémiologie as a 
meta-science in which all nonverbal communicative signs, including linguistic ones, 
are  ordered  and  explicated  «par  les  lois  de  cette  science»  (35)  and  one  of  its 
members, language, which will act as its «patron general». (101) This tension has 
had  methodological  consequences,  as  fostering  research  questions  such  as  ‘What 
kind of language is cinema?’ While this is not quite as absurd as asking «What kind 
of carrot is a potato?» it has led to an entire industry of film criticism discovering 
Saussurean  linguistic  relations  in  visual  semiosis.  (cf.  Metz  1971).  Both  these 
differences  have  a  strong  bearing  on  the  topic  of  Saussure  as  a  philosopher  of 
language. For his constraints on the range of sémiologie eliminate the most important 
source of one of the components of the linguistic sign as a candidate of investigation: 
idée, concept, or Vorstellung. In contrast, the Peircean approach allows for olfactory, 
gustatory,  kinetic,  thermal,  gravitational,  aural,  tactile,  and  visual  readings  as 
heterosemiotic  processes  by  which  we,  as  well  as  pre-linguistic  beings,  read  the 
nonverbal world. Furthermore, we have already established the non-congruence of 
verbal  and  nonverbal  distinctions  of  which  humans  are  capable  and  so  are  in  a 
position to extend the nonverbal scenario to social practice. At the heart of such a 
post-Peircean picture is the emphasis on resemblance relations or iconicity by which 
we  find  our  way  about  in  the  world.  (CP  1.158)  If  this  is  so,  then  the  alleged 
arbitrariness of the linguistic sign proves an unmanageable hurdle to the theorisation 
of the relation between nonverbal readings of the world and language. There is no RIFL (2010) 3: 12-10 (Saussure filosofo del linguaggio, 10) 
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room in this essay to expound this relation. Suffice it here to sum up the argument by 
saying that if it can be shown that iconic relations play a significant role in the 
linguistic sign by constituting the signified, then language must be declared to be 
parasitic on nonverbal signs. (Ruthrof 1997; 2000; 2010) 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
If nonverbal signs are motivated and if language cannot function without nonverbal 
semiosis,  then  the  linguistic  sign  cannot  be  arbitrary  in  the  way  Saussure  has 
proposed.  The  radical  arbitrariness  of  structural  linguistics  fails.  From  the 
perspective of the philosophy of language, this failure is the result of a linguistic anti-
realism  denying  the  existence  of  nonverbal  facts  by  the  very  definition  of  the 
linguistic sign. The paper has tried to demonstrate that those extra-linguistic facts can 
and must be retrieved via nonverbal semiosis. Thus, perception and Vorstellung re-
enter the picture, not as nebulous clouds but rather as a systemically coherent world 
into which language gears. What separates Saussure’s project most radically from the 
mainstream of the philosophy of language, then, is that his definition of the linguistic 
sign lets go of Putnam’s ‘ropes’. Freed from its anchor of systemic perception and its 
transformations in Vorstellung, the Saussurean linguistic sign takes on a life of its 
own as an arbitrary relation subsuming and emptying out all nonverbal phenomena in 
its idealist circularity. As a consequence, the Saussurean scenario disallows any of 
the traditional correspondence moves which we find in the philosophy of language, 
such  as  referential,  verificationist,  or  truth-conditional  arguments.  Neither  can 
Saussurean linguistics accommodate cognitive investigations committed to a neurally 
motivated explanation of perception, Vorstellung and language, nor is the Saussurean 
project  compatible  with  Peircean  semiotics  in  which  iconicity,  or  resemblance 
relations, ties language to the world. According to Saussure, what systematicity we 
do  find  in  language  can  only  be  of  its  own  making.  In  light  of  the  theoretical 
obstacles to Saussure’s rudimentary theory of meaning and the scientific evidence 
available  to  us  now,  we  should  abandon  his  radical  arbitrariness  thesis  of  the 
linguistic sign and replace it by something like the following redefinition, with all the 
consequences this change entails for the description of meaning: the linguistic sign is 
a  hybrid  unity  made  up  of  an  arbitrary  signifier  and  a  motivated  signified.  This 
allows for natural language to straddle the domains of formal and fully iconic sign 
systems without being identifiable with either. 
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